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power to avoid fraudulent conveyances. One is section 67d,2
largely derived from the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,8
which may be considered a re-statement of the common law of
fraudulent conveyances. 29 The other is section 70e, which provides in part: "A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred
by a debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this Act which, under any
Federal or State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against
or voidable for any other reason by any creditor of the debtor,
having a claim provable under this Act, shall be null and void
as against the trustee of such debtor." 30 In most states, the law of
fraudulent conveyances, made available to trustees in bankruptcy
through section 70e, is substantially similar to section 67d; in
Louisiana, however, trustees in bankruptcy often have a choice
of substantive law. 81 The transfer in Holohan v. Durand could
have been attacked under section 67d had it not been made more
than a year before bankruptcy 82 and promptly recorded.3 8 As it
was, the trustee necessarily invoked section 70e.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert A. Pascal*
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
The decision in Liebendorfer v. Gayle' raises a fascinating
question which the writer finds difficult to answer. Husband and
wife, Louisiana domiciliaries, were separated from bed and board
in Louisiana and some months later a conventional partition of
community assets was executed by them. Thereafter the wife
secured from an Arkansas court a divorce judgment in which
the conventional partition was "incorporated"-apparently at
her request, without opposition of the husband, and without allegation of its defect or invalidity by either spouse. Following this
the wife sought a Louisiana declaration of the nullity of the partition, alleging fraud on the husband's part in the classification
27. 11 U.S.C. § 107d (1964).
28. 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 48 (1957).
29. 4 W. COLER, BANKRUPTCY § 67.29[2J (1967).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 110e (1964).
31. For a discussion of differences between the common law of fraudulent
conveyances and the Louisiana law, see Currie, The First Act of Bankruptcy
in Louisiana, 27 LA. L. REv. 16 (1966).
32. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107d(2) (1964).
33. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(5), 11 U.S.C. § 107d(5) (1964).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 So.2d 37 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied.
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of certain assets. The judges of the district and appellate courts
persistently declared the Louisiana partition "incorporated" in
the Arkansas judgment and entitled to full faith and credit unless
that judgment were subject to collateral attack in Arkansas.
Whether the Arkansas judgment so far as it was a divorce judgment was or was not entitled to full faith and credit will not be
discussed here, for this question was irrelevant to the issue involved. What was involved was whether the judgment, so far
as it purported to be one on a patrimonial issue (partition of
the community of acquets and gains) was entitled to full faith
and credit. Assuming both parties were before the court, the
ordinary elements of procedural due process for patrimonial
issues were satisfied and the judgment was res judicata and
entitled to full faith and credit if otherwise valid. What causes
the writer to doubt the judgment could be considered a valid
judgment at all is that apparently no controversy concerning
the partition was presented to the court, neither party having
challenged its validity. Without a case or controversy there can
be nothing to adjudicate. And if there is nothing to adjudicate,
it would seem there cannot be a valid judgment or, therefore,
entitlement to full faith and credit. 2 By way of analogy, it is
noteworthy that under Article 2272 of the Louisiana Civil Code
"the act of confirmation or ratification of an obligation is valid
only when it contains... the mention of the motive of the action
of rescission, and the intention of supplying the defect on which
that action is founded." A conventional ratification or confirmation, in other words, cannot be valid if the cause for the nullity
or rescission of the act is not known and stated at the time of
ratification or confirmation. By analogy, it seems proper to conclude that a judgment purporting to ratify or confirm (or "incor2. Even if such judicial confirmations of unchallenged juridical acts as
occurred in this case had been given the effect of judgments under Arkansas
law there would be the question whether such a law were entitled to recognition under the full faith and credit clause. A state cannot enlarge or
decrease the scope of full faith and credit by defining "judgment" for itself
or creating its own standards for the validity of a judgment. The standards
or criteria for full faith and credit are necessarily a federal question. Otherwise the constitutional clause would be but a device by which each state
could determine for itself when its laws or judgments were to be recognized
by other states. The correctness of this is illustrated by, for example, the
United States Supreme Court's refusal to recognize either judgments based
on a state's own criteria for jurisdiction or state laws taxing persons or
regulating business activities when these do not meet minimal federal standards for delimiting interstate competence. See, e.g., International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), on legislative competence to tax certain
persons, and Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955), on state
or territorial competence to define for itself "domicile" as a basis of legislative or Judicial divorce competence.
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porate") a previous conventional act should be given effect as
such only if the cause for the nullity or rescission of the act is
known and mentioned by the party who might claim it. Thus,
in the writer's opinion, the "incorporation" of the conventional
partition in the Arkansas divorce judgment-itself a separable
patrimonial judgment-should not have been considered a bar
to such attacks as are permitted by law on conventional partitions. Admittedly, however, the question warrants much more
careful study than it is given here.
INTERSTATE JUDICIAL JURISDICTION

Dupre v. Guillory3 decided that Louisiana could reduce for
the future the plaintiff's previously adjudicated liability for alimony to his divorced wife, who had become domiciled in another
state, without personal service upon her. The rationale was that
the personal jurisdiction which the state had over her at the time
of the original judgment "continued" in spite of her ceasing to
be domiciled here. Whether the fact that the plaintiff husband
had filed his petition in the same suit in which the original judgment had been rendered was considered significant by the court
is not clear from the opinion. The court called the question "res
nova in Louisiana" and relied on 62 A.L.R.2d 544, section 2 (a),
for support. The decision reflects the need for Louisiana legislation under which Louisiana courts would be permitted to exercise
personal jurisdiction in such and similar cases, but it is, nevertheless, without foundation in the current legislation. The original suit for alimony had terminated. Nothing in the legislation
suggests jurisdiction over a person is retained once a suit is terminated. Furthermore, under article 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Louisiana courts are limited in their exercise of judicial
power to render judgments in personam in instances in which
there is (1) service on the person or his agent for service of process; (2) service on an attorney appointed by the court to represent an absent or incompetent domiciliary; and (3) voluntary
submission or waiver of exception to the exercise of judicial
power over him. The article does not extend the judicial power
of Louisiana courts to persons not domiciled in this state and
neither represented here nor submitting voluntarily to its judicial
actions.
Legislation authorizing the exercise of personal jurisdiction
3. 216 So.2d 327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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in such cases as this and similar ones should be passed. Louisiana's original Code of Practice would have allowed such suits.4
Probably it is only because the redactors of the Code of Civil
Procedure thought it necessary to comply with Pennoyer v.
Neff 5 and its progeny that article 6 was drawn as strictly as it
was." Today it should be possible to argue that the rationale of
Pennoyer v. Neff has been discredited and its rule relaxed for instances in which greater overall fairness can be realized by allowing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries.
The "doing business," "use of the highways," and "long arm"
rules give evidence of the actual movement away from Pennoyer v. Neff in the direction of an effective remedy for the
local plaintiff where requiring him to sue the defendant at his
domicile would cause undue hardship. In a fact situation like
the present one, where the plaintiff seeks to terminate or reduce
a continuing obligation to another rather than to establish positively a claim against him, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
by the plaintiff's state seems very reasonable. Indeed, if a nondomiciliary expects to enjoy a continuing but variable rightand this is what alimony is-against a domiciliary on the basis
of the domiciliary's law, it would seem eminently reasonable to
expect the non-domiciliary to submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the domiciliary's state for adjudications touching the
question of decreased entitlement under that law.
CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE

The decision in Dupre v. Rochester Ropes, Inc.7 affirms in
effect that parties who began life together in Louisiana as concubine and paramour may be found to have contracted marriage
later by living together with the intent of being husband and
wife in a state (Texas) which recognizes such conduct as sufficient form for the contracting of marriage. Under the general
principle that the capacity of parties to marry is determined by
the law of their domicile (or, more exactly, intended domicile
after marriage) 8 this decision is certainly correct. It is, however,
contrary to the 1957 Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Brinson
4. La. Code of Practice arts. 116, 194, 197 (1870), which did not distinguish
between absentee domiciliaries and absentee non-domiciliaries and required
only service against the curator of the absentee.
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
6. LA. CoDE CIv. P. art. 6, comment (2).
7. 216 So.2d 589 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
8. This is the principle Implicit in the rules of the so-called Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act in force in Louisiana as LA. R.S. 9:221-224 (1950).
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v. Brinson.9 There the parties, whose celebrated marriage in
Louisiana was null by reason of the man's undissolved marriage
to another, later moved to Mississippi and continued to live together as man and wife after the man's first wife died. The court,
admitting at least arguendo that under Mississippi law their conduct would have constituted the contracting of marriage, nevertheless presumed the continuation of concubinage in the absence
of a formal ceremony of marriage. This decision in Brinson was
criticized by Professor Dainow on the ground that the form of
marriage celebration (exchange of consent) should be considered
subject to the law of the place of celebration (exchange of consent) .10 The writer also considers this position correct and hence
agrees that Dupre was decided correctly on this principal issue.
It may be pointed out nevertheless that it would be wrong to
presume the intent of a couple to be husband and wife simply
because they live together in a jurisdiction recognizing informal
marriage, especially if their life in common began in plain concubinage or after a marriage ceremony known to be invalid. The
intent to be married must be shown to have existed at a time at
which the parties could have contracted marriage informally, for
the couple might indeed have been content to continue their
illicit relationship.
CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW
Hector Currie*
The Louisiana Constitution provides that, except in a capital
case, prosecution "shall be by indictment or information."1 In
State v. La Caze,2 defendants, jointly charged in a bill of information with simple burglary,3 moved to quash the information
on the basis of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury.. ."), and the fourteenth amendment. The motions
were overruled and the convictions affirmed. State v. Young 4
had held the quoted words of the fifth amendment inapplicable
9. 233 La. 417, 96 So.2d 653 (1957).
10. The Work of the Louisiana Stpreme Court for the 1956-1957 TermConflict of Laws, 18 LA. L. REv. 60, 62 (1957).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
2. 252 La. 971, 215 So.2d 511 (1968).
3. LA. R.S. 14:62 (1950).
4. 249 La. 609, 188 So.2d 421 (1966).

